






































prolific	 years	 of	 Investor-State	 Dispute	 Settlement	 (‘ISDS’),	 are	 not	 a	 common	 or	
typical	presence	in	most	traditional	International	Investment	Agreements	(‘IIAs’),	be	
it	 in	the	form	of	Bilateral	Investment	Treaties	(‘BITs’)	or	 in	the	form	of	Free	Trade	











3 The	 purpose	 of	 the	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause	 is	 to	 exclude	 from	 the	 protection	
afforded	by	applicable	 IIA	 investors	 and	 their	 investments	who,	 although	 formally	
satisfying	the	definition	of	investor,	do	not	have	a	real	(economic)	connection	with	
the	 home	 State	 (→	 International	 investment	 arbitration;	 →	 Nationality	 of	 claim:	
Investment	 arbitration).	 In	Caratube	 v.	 Kazakhstan,	 the	 arbitral	 tribunal	 explained	
that	
	
This [denial of benefits] provision allows each of the parties to deny the benefits of the BIT’s 
protection to a company that is controlled by nationals of a third State and does not have 
any substantial activities in the other State-party to the BIT (Caratube v. Kazakhstan, 2012 
para 354).  
	
4 Dolzer	and	Schreuer	consider	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause	as	a	‘method	to	counteract	
strategies	 that	 seek	 the	 protection	 of	 particular	 treaties	 by	 acquiring	 a	 favourable	
nationality’	 (Dolzer	 and	 Schreuer,	 55).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 Salacuse	 explains	 that	
allowing	the	benefits	of	the	IIA	to	nationals	of	third	countries	or	to	those	’primarily	
associated’	 with	 those	 countries	 and	 with	 which	 the	 denying	 country	 has	 no	

















right	 to	 investment	 protection	 under	 the	 ЕСТ,	 because	 the	 host	 State	 of	 the	
investment	has	the	power	to	divest	the	Investor	of	this	right.	In	this	second	class	are	
legal	entities	that	satisfy	the	nationality	requirement	by	reason	of	incorporation	but	
are	 owned	 or	 controlled	 by	 nationals	 of	 a	 third	 state	 in	 a	 manner	 potentially	







17	 is	 readily	 comprehensible.	 'Long	 term	 economic	 cooperation',	

























When available, a denial of benefits provision, rather than the principle of abuse of right, 
should be a respondent’s first choice when facing a claim brought by a company that 
appears to lack any genuine connection to its purported home State. There are several 
reasons to prefer a defence based on a denial of benefits provision. First, the abuse of right 
principle is not grounded in treaty text … Third, denial of benefits provisions reflect the 
express and shared views of the parties to the treaty regarding the circumstances in which 
treaty benefits can be denied … (Feldman, 2012, 283). 
	
8 In	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause	 relied	 on	 by	 respondent,	 arbitral	
tribunals	are	generally	reluctant	to	investigate	the	corporate	structure	of	 investors	
and	 their	 economic	 activities	 in	 the	 alleged	 home	 State.	 To	 the	 contrary,	 arbitral	




On a more general level, the Arbitral Tribunal shares the position taken under the ECT by the 
tribunal in the Yukos case, according to which ’the Tribunal knows of no general principles of 
international law that would require investigating the structure of a company or another 
organization when the applicable treaty simply requires it to be organized in accordance 
with the laws of a Contracting Party’ (Charanne v. Spain, 2016, para 417). 
	





BIT	 contains	no	denial-of-benefits	 clause	 that	would	 require	 that	 a	U.K.	 investor	
have	 actual	 operations	 in	 the	 U.K.	 And	 the	 weight	 of	 the	 evidence	 shows	 that	
Turkmenistan	 knew	 and	 accepted	 that	 it	 was	 dealing	with	 an	 English	 company	
(Garanti	Koza	v.	Turkmenistan,	2016,	para	222).	
	
10 In	 Tokios	 Tokelés	 v.	 Ukraine,	 the	 arbitral	 tribunal	 also	 took	 the	 view	 that,	 in	 the	
absence	of	a	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause,	the	tribunal	cannot	impose	any	limitation	on	




’denial	of	benefits’	provision	with	 respect	 to	entities	 controlled	by	 third-country	













of	 countering	 aggressive	 or	 merely	 tactical	 (IIA)	 treaty	 shopping	 by	 way	 of	
incorporation	 of	 convenience	 (→	 Forum	 shopping:	 Investment	 arbitration).	
Consequently,	they	are	part	of	the	broader	policy	debate	for	reform	of	ISDS	and	IIAs	
(UNCTAD/WIR/2016,123).	The	discussions	in	the	sessions	of	the	UNCITRAL	Working	
Group	 III,	 addressing	 the	 ISDS	 reform,	 alluded	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 treaty	 shopping,	









clause	 was	 later	 imported	 into	 the	 treaties	 concerning	 protection	 of	 foreign	
investments.	Traditionally,	the	US,	Canada,	China	and	Australia,	in	their	BITs	or	FTAs	
have	inserted,	even	from	the	early	generations	of	IIAs,	provisions	denying	the	benefits	





any	 of	 the	 rights	 and	 privileges	 accorded	 by	 this	 Treaty	 to	 any	 corporation	 or	
association	created	or	organized	under	the	laws	and	regulations	of	the	other	High	





a	party	may	utilize	 if	 it	wishes	 to	 take	 the	 initiative	 of	 so	doing.’(Walker	 Jr.,	 388).	
















company,	 provided	 that	whenever	 one	 Party	 concludes	 that	 the	 benefits	 of	 this	
Treaty	should	not	be	extended	to	a	company	of	the	other	Party	for	this	reason,	it	











company	 of	 any	 third	 country,	 the	 Contracting	 Parties	 may	 decide	 jointly	 in	
consultation	 not	 to	 extend	 the	 rights	 and	 benefits	 of	 this	 Agreement	 to	 such	
company.		
	












































the	 new	Agreement	 extends	 the	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause	 to	 instances	where	 the	
putative	investor	is	owned	or	controlled	not	only	by	persons	of	a	non-Party,	but	also	

















































2.	 Subject	 to	 Articles	 18.3	 (Notification	 and	 Provision	 of	 Information)	 and	 20.4	
(Consultations),	a	Party	may	deny	the	benefits	of	this	Chapter	to	an	investor	of	the	





























the	 company	 has	 no	 substantial	 business	 activities	 in	 the	 Party	 where	 it	 is	
established.	 Thus,	 the	 United	 States	 could	 deny	 benefits	 to	 a	 company	 that	 is	 a	
subsidiary	of	a	shell	company	organized	under	the	laws	of	Bolivia	if	controlled	by	
nationals	of	a	third	country.	However,	this	provision	would	not	generally	permit	the	










































One	 side	may,	 at	 any	 time	 including	after	 the	 institution	of	 any	proceedings	 in	
accordance	with	Chapter	3	(Investment	Facilitation	and	Settlement	of	Disputes),	
















(b)	 the	 denying	 Party	 adopts	 or	maintains	 a	measure	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 third	
country	that:	
(i)	relates	to	the	maintenance	of	international	peace	and	security;	and	







30 Further,	 Article	 13	 of	 the	 Model	 Agreement	 Between	 The	 Belgium-Luxembourg	








the	 non-	 Contracting	 Party,	 or	 a	 natural	 person,	 or	 an	 enterprise	 of	 the	 non-
Contracting	Party	that:	
a.	are	related	to	the	maintenance	of	international	peace	and	security;	
b.	 prohibit	 transactions	 with	 such	 natural	 person	 or	 enterprise	 or	 would	 be	
violated	or	 circumvented	 if	 the	 benefits	 of	 this	 Chapter	were	 accorded	 to	 the	
investor	or	to	its	investments.	
2.	For	avoidance	of	any	doubt,	the	benefits	of	this	Agreement	shall	be	denied	if	the	

































transactions	 with	 the	 enterprise	 or	 that	 would	 be	 violated	 or	






















non-Party	 that	 prohibit	 transactions	 with	 the	 enterprise	 or	 that	 would	 be	
violated	or	circumvented	 if	 the	benefits	of	 this	Chapter	were	accorded	to	the	
enterprise	or	to	its	investments;	or	









35 The	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause,	 as	 explained,	 performs	 the	 essential	 function	 of	
preventing	 the	misuse	 of	 the	 protection	 accorded	 by	 IIAs,	 in	 particular	 when	 the	


















































claim.	Generally,	 the	 language	of	 the	 IIAs	 includes	 reference	 to	 ‘[e]ach	Contracting	
Party	reserves	the	right	to	deny’,	as	it	is	the	case	of	Article	17	of	the	ECT,	or	to	‘[a]	
Party	may	deny’,	as	in	Article	14.17	of	Japan-Australia	FTA.	Such	language	implies	that	
this	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 right	must	 be	 exercised	 by	 the	 host	 State.	 Few	 IIAs	would	
contain	 a	wording	which	 could	 suggest	 the	 automatic	 application	 of	 the	 ‘denial	 of	









































Contracting	Party,	 to	be	exercised	 in	 the	 future.	Had	Article	17	been	 intended	to	
deny	 benefits	 automatically,	 it	 could	 easily	 have	 been	 phrased	 to	 do	 so.	 A	
formulation	such	as:	‘The	advantages	of	Part	III	of	the	ECT	shall	be	denied	to’	would	
have	 made	 such	 meaning	 plain.	 This	 leads	 the	 Tribunal	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	
Contracting	Party’s	right	to	deny	the	benefits	of	Part	III	of	the	ECT	must	be	exercised	
actively.	











declaration	 in	 a	 Contracting	 State’s	 official	 gazette	 could	 suffice;	 or	 a	 statutory	
provision	in	a	Contracting	State’s	investment	or	other	laws;	or	even	an	exchange	of	
letters	with	 a	 particular	 investor	 or	 class	 of	 investors.	 Given	 that	 in	 practice	 an	
investor	must	distinguish	between	Contracting	States	with	different	state	practices,	
it	is	not	unreasonable	or	impractical	to	interpret	Article	17(1)	as	requiring	that	a	















in	 accordance	 with	 Articles	 1803	 (Notification	 and	 Provision	 of	 Information)	 and	
2006	(Consultations)’	of	NAFTA.	Other	IIAs,	such	as	Article	2(2)	of	the	Australia-Czech	
Republic	BIT,	refer	to	a	joint	consultation	between	the	Contracting	Parties	upon	which	




































the	 US,	 but	 nothing	 which	 would	 indicate	 that	 there	 were	 ‘consultations	 such	 as	








this	 Chapter’.	 The	Ampal	 tribunal	 considered	 that	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 discretionary	











of	 benefits’	 clause,	 both	 are	meant	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 clause	produces	 the	desired	
effects.	Both	aspects	ensure	the	correct	application	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause,	
in	 the	 sense	 that,	 on	 one	 hand,	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 parties	 to	 the	 relevant	 IIA	 are	
preserved	and	benefits	of	the	treaty	are	granted	to	proper	investors,	and,	on	the	other,	





the	 IIA.	 Arguably,	 when	 notification	 or	 consultation	 steps	 are	 not	 included	 in	 the	
‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause,	 the	 State	 parties	 to	 the	 IIA	 intended	 to	 increase	 the	
prerogatives	 of	 the	 denying	 State	 in	 respect	 to	 these	 putative	 investors	 and	 their	
investments	(Mistelis	and	Baltag,	2009,	1320).	As	suggested	by	the	tribunal	in	Ampal	
v.	Egypt,	such	negotiations	or	consultation	may	be	mandatory	or	not.	If	mandatory,	






51 The	manner	 in	 which	 the	 host	 State	 exercises	 the	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause	 with	
respect	to	the	putative	investor	tends	to	be	more	controversial.	This	aspect	is	closely	

















accordance	with	 the	principles	of	 treaty	 interpretation,	as	well	as	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
interests	of	host	States	 should	be	equally	upheld	 in	 this	 context.	On	 the	 first	 limb,	
arbitral	tribunals	are	called	upon	to	apply	the	relevant	‘denial	of	benefits’	clause.	If	
the	wording	 of	 the	 clause	 does	 not	 lead	 to	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	 notification	 of	
investor	is	required	and,	furthermore,	no	time	limits	are	associated	with	the	exercise	
of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	right,	arbitral	tribunals	should	be	cautious	in	reading	such	
prerequisites	 into	 this	 clause.	 While	 relying	 on	 the	 object	 and	 purpose	 of	 the	
applicable	 IIA	 is	 appropriate	 in	 the	 context	 of	 treaty	 interpretation,	 this	 cannot	
contradict	the	textual	interpretation	of	the	applicable	provision.	If	the	parties	to	the	















is	 an	 effective	 one,	 considering	 that	 such	 general	 notice	 is	 the	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	









(→	 Jurisdiction;	→	 Admissibility).	 When	 an	 arbitral	 tribunal	 considers	 a	 matter	 to	
pertain	 to	 its	 jurisdiction,	 that	 decision	may	 be	 challenged	 under	 the	 appropriate	
available	 mechanism.	 As	 such,	 erroneously	 considering	 an	 issue	 pertaining	 to	
jurisdiction,	could	‘result	in	an	unjustified	extension	of	the	scope	for	challenging	the	
awards’	 (Paulsson,	2005,	601).	Consequently,	whether	or	not	 the	 invocation	of	 the	








55 The	position	 of	 arbitral	 tribunals	 should	 not	 be	 considered	 in	 a	 vacuum,	 but	with	
specific	 insight	 into	 the	 relevant	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause,	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	
customary	rules	of	treaty	interpretation	as	codified	by	the	Vienna	Convention	on	the	
Law	 of	 Treaties.	 From	 this	 perspective	 several	 aspects	 would	 likely	 influence	 the	
decision	of	an	arbitral	tribunal.	Among	them,	the	position	of	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	
clause	in	the	structure	of	the	relevant	IIA,	as	well	as	the	wording	of	the	clause	are	of	




26	 ECT,	 interpreted	 under	 Article	 31(1)	 of	 the	 Vienna	 Convention.	 The	 express	
terms	of	Article	17	refer	to	a	denial	of	the	advantages	‘of	this	Part’,	thereby	referring	
to	the	substantive	advantages	conferred	upon	an	investor	by	Part	III	of	the	ECT.	The	
language	 is	 unambiguous;	 but	 it	 is	 confirmed	 by	 the	 title	 to	 Article	 17:	 ‘Non-
Application	of	Part	III	in	Certain	Circumstances’.	…	From	these	terms,	interpreted	
in	 good	 faith	 in	 accordance	 with	 their	 ordinary	 contextual	 meaning,	 the	 denial	
applies	 only	 to	 advantages	 under	 Part	 III.	 It	 would	 therefore	 require	 a	 gross	
manipulation	of	the	language	to	make	it	refer	to	Article	26	in	Part	V	of	the	ECT.	
Article	26	provides	a	procedural	remedy	for	a	covered	investor’s	claims;	and	it	is	
not	physically	or	 juridically	part	of	 the	ECT’s	 substantive	advantages	enjoyed	by	
that	investor	under	Part	III.	As	a	matter	of	language,	it	would	have	been	simple	to	
exclude	a	class	of	investors	completely	from	the	scope	of	the	ECT	as	a	whole,	as	do	
certain	 other	 bilateral	 investment	 treaties;	 but	 that	 is	 self-evidently	 not	 the	
approach	 taken	 in	 the	 ECT.	 This	 limited	 exclusion	 from	 Part	 III	 for	 a	 covered	
investor,	dependent	on	certain	specific	criteria,	requires	a	procedure	to	resolve	a	
dispute	as	to	whether	that	exclusion	applies	in	any	particular	case;	and	the	object	




purpose	of	 the	ECT	and	concluded	 that	allowing	an	 interpretation	of	 the	 ‘denial	of	







state	and	 the	covered	 investor,	given	 that	 such	determination	 is	 crucial	 to	both?	













57 Subsequent	 tribunals	 adopted	 the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 arbitral	 tribunal	 in	 Plama	 v.	
Bulgaria.	For	example,	the	tribunal	in	the	Yukos	cases	referred	to	this	issue	as	follows:	
	
However,	 insofar	 as	 those	 arguments	 are	 deemed	 to	 address	 the	 question	 of	




Part’	 but	 in	 Part	 V	 of	 the	 Treaty.	 Whether	 or	 not	 Claimant	 is	 entitled	 to	 the	
advantages	of	Part	III	is	a	question	not	of	jurisdiction	but	of	the	merits.	Since	Article	
17	 relates	not	 to	 the	ECT	as	a	whole,	or	 to	Part	V,	but	exclusively	 to	Part	 III,	 its	
interpretation	 for	 that	 reason	 cannot	 determine	 whether	 the	 Tribunal	 has	
jurisdiction	to	entertain	the	claims	of	Claimant.	…	This	Tribunal	finds	the	reasoning	
of	 the	 Plama	 tribunal	 on	 this	 point	 convincing	 and	 adopts	 it	 (Yukos	 v.	 Russian	










59 The	 same	position	 that	 the	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause	pertains	 to	 the	merits	 of	 the	
dispute,	rather	than	to	jurisdiction,	was	retained	by	the	arbitral	tribunals	constituted	
under	Article	26	of	 the	ECT,	 in	 Isolux	v.	 Spain	(para	712)	and	 in	Khan	Resources	v.	
Mongolia	 (para	 411),	 as	well	 as	 by	 the	 tribunals	 in	Bridgestone	 v.	 Panama,	 under	























protection	 strictly,	 investors	 would	 still	 have	 access	 to	 the	 dispute	 resolution	

































IIA	 and	 of	 the	 arbitration	 rules,	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 respondent	 State	 had	
exercised	 the	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 right	 in	 a	 timely	manner.	The	practice	of	 arbitral	
tribunals	under	this	point	varies,	although	some	arbitral	tribunals	advise	for	a	strict	
application	of	 the	 ‘denial	of	benefits’	clause,	given	the	exceptional	character	of	 this	
provision.	For	example,	 in	Ascom	v.	Kazakhstan,	 the	tribunal	held	that	 ‘Art.	17	ECT	







The	Treaty	 seeks	 to	 create	a	predictable	 legal	 framework	 for	 investments	 in	 the	
energy	field.	This	predictability	materializes	only	if	investors	can	know	in	advance	
whether	 they	are	entitled	 to	 the	protections	of	 the	Treaty.	 If	an	 investor	such	as	
Khan	Netherlands,	who	falls	within	the	definition	of	‘Investor’	at	Article	1(7)	of	the	
Treaty	and	 is	 therefore	entitled	 to	 the	Treaty’s	protections	 in	principle,	could	be	
denied	 the	benefit	 of	 the	Treaty	at	 any	moment	after	 it	has	 invested	 in	 the	host	
country,	it	would	find	itself	in	a	highly	unpredictable	situation.	This	lack	of	certainty	

















The	 covered	 investor	 enjoys	 the	 advantages	 of	 Part	 III	 unless	 the	 host	 state	
exercises	 its	 right	 under	Article	 17(1)	 ECT;	 and	 a	 putative	 covered	 investor	 has	
legitimate	 expectations	 of	 such	 advantages	 until	 that	 right’s	 exercise.	 A	 putative	
investor	therefore	requires	reasonable	notice	before	making	any	investment	in	the	
host	state	whether	or	not	that	host	state	has	exercised	its	right	under	Article	17(1)	






















territory	of	 the	 respondent’,	which	 ‘would	place	 an	untenable	burden	on	a	CAFTA	
Party’.	(Pacific	Rim	v.	El	Salvador,	2012	para.	4.56)	
	
67 Other	 arbitral	 tribunals,	 under	 the	 ICSID	 Arbitration	 Rules,	 as	 well	 as	 under	 the	
UNCITRAL	Arbitration	Rules,	have	considered	that	the	respondent	State	can	validly	
exercise	 the	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 right	 at	 the	 latest	 when	 raising	 objections	 to	
jurisdiction.	In	EMELEC	v.	Ecuador,	the	tribunal	concluded	that	‘Ecuador	announced	














is	 the	 time-limit	 in	 this	 case	 here	 incorporated	 by	 reference	 into	 CAFTA	Article	





























70 Nevertheless,	 the	 tribunal	 in	 Ampal	 v.	 Egypt,	 deviating	 from	 the	 decisions	 of	 the	
































accordingly	 prior	 to	making	 its	 investment.	 If,	 however,	 the	 right’s	 exercise	 had	
retrospective	 effect,	 the	 consequences	 for	 the	 investor	 would	 be	 serious.	 The	
investor	could	not	plan	in	the	‘long	term’	for	such	an	effect	(if	at	all);	and	indeed	
such	an	unexercised	right	could	lure	putative	investors	with	legitimate	expectations	






In	 any	 event,	 if	 the	 passage	 in	 Respondent’s	 First	 Memorial	 quoted	 above	 in	
paragraph	447	is	construed	as	an	exercise	of	the	reserved	right	of	denial,	it	can	only	
be	 prospective	 in	 effect	 from	 the	 date	 of	 that	 Memorial.	 To	 treat	 denial	 as	
retrospective	would,	in	the	light	of	the	ECT’s	‘Purpose,’	as	set	out	in	Article	2	of	the	
Treaty	(‘The	Treaty	establishes	a	legal	framework	in	order	to	promote	long-term	
cooperation	 in	 the	 energy	 field	 ...’)	 be	 incompatible	 ‘with	 the	 objectives	 and	























finding	 of	 previous	 arbitral	 tribunals	 on	 the	 prospective	 effect	 of	 the	 ‘denial	 of	
benefits’	provision	under	Article	17	of	the	ECT:	
	
A	 majority	 of	 the	 Tribunal	 accepts	 that	 submission.	 It	 considers	 that	 it	 would	
contradict	the	text	and	the	purposes	of	the	ECT	to	say	that	a	Contracting	State	may	
deny	benefits	retrospectively,	after	an	investment	has	been	made	and	a	dispute	has	
arisen.	 That	 would	 be	 contrary	 to	 the	 transparency,	 co-operation	 and	 stability	
objectives	of	the	ECT	and	it	would	lead	to	anomalous	results.	The	majority	notes	

































79 It	 appears	 that	 arbitral	 tribunals	 constituted	 under	 the	 ECT	 give	 full	 effect	 to	 the	
prospective	 application	 of	 the	 ‘denial	 of	 benefits’	 clause	 under	 Article	 17,	 while	








CAFTA	 can	 only	 be	 upheld	 if	 a	 retrospective	 effect	 is	 attached	 to	 this	 provision	
(Behlman,	 2014,	 417).	 The	 retroactive	 or	 prospective	 application	 of	 a	 ‘denial	 of	
benefits’	clause,	should	indeed	rest	on	the	specific	language	of	the	provision.	However,	
it	 is	 not	 evident	 that	 the	 two	 examples	 above	 would,	 indeed,	 justify	 a	 divergent	
approach.	In	both	cases,	host	States	have	a	discretionary	right	in	deciding	to	deny	the	





benefits’	 or	 the	 Preamble	 of	 CAFTA-DR	 referring	 to	 ‘a	 predictable	 commercial	
framework	 for	business	planning	and	 investment’.	 In	 this	respect,	one	could	argue	
how	both	prospective	 and	 retrospective	 effects	 could	be	upheld	by	parties.	At	 the	








give	 full	 effect	 to	 the	 reciprocal	 nature	 of	 IIAs,	 as	well	 as	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 legal	
certainty,	 as	 explained	 by	 the	 tribunal	 in	 Liman	 Caspian	 Oil	 v.	 Kazakhstan,	 which	
would	imply	that	‘an	investor	must	be	able	to	rely	on	the	advantages	under	the	ECT,	
as	long	as	the	host	state	has	not	explicitly	invoked	the	right	to	deny	such	advantages’	
(Liman	 Caspian	 Oil	 v.	 Kazakhstan,	 2010,	 para	 225).	 Furthermore,	 such	 approach	
would	be	backed	by	the	legitimate	expectations	investors	have	to	be	protected	as	long	
as	host	States	do	not	decide	to	rely	on	the	‘denial	of	benefits’	right,	especially	when	
















advancing	 the	 allegation,	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 maxim	 onus	 probandi	 actori	
incumbit.	In	application	of	this	principle,	a	claimant	has	the	burden	to	prove	that	it	
satisfies	the	definition	of	an	Investor	so	as	to	be	entitled	to	the	Part	III	protections	
and	 the	right	 to	arbitrate	disputes	 in	Article	26.	On	 the	same	basis,	 the	claimant	
would	be	expected	to	have	the	burden	of	proof	that	it	controls,	directly	or	indirectly,	
an	Investment	for	which	protection	is	sought,	and	this	is	a	fact	explicitly	stated	in	
Understanding	 3	 to	 the	 Final	 Act.	 However,	when	 a	 respondent	 alleges	 that	 the	
claimant	is	of	the	class	of	Investors	only	entitled	to	defeasible	protection,	so	that	the	
respondent	 can	 exercise	 its	 power	 to	 deny,	 then	 the	 burden	 passes	 to	 the	
respondent	to	prove	the	factual	prerequisites	of	Article	17	on	which	it	relies.	Article	














The	Tribunal	approaches	this	 issue	as	 to	denial	of	benefits	on	the	basis	 that	 it	 is	
primarily	 for	 the	 Respondent	 to	 establish,	 both	 as	 to	 law	 and	 fact,	 its	 positive	



























substantial	 business	 activities	 at	 the	 place	 of	 incorporation.	 We	 are	 thus	 in	 the	
scenario	in	which	the	legal	entity	formally	satisfies	the	requirements	of	the	definition	








Article	 17	 is	 entitled	 ‘Non-Application	 of	 Part	 III	 in	 Certain	 Circumstances’;	 and	










It	 is	 apparent	 from	 the	wording	 of	 Article	 17(1)	 that	 two	 additional	 cumulative	
substantive	 conditions	must	 be	met	 before	 the	 ‘denial-of-benefits’	 clause	 can	 be	
exercised	in	respect	of	any	particular	legal	entity.	First,	such	legal	entity	must	be	
owned	or	controlled	by	citizens	or	nationals	of	a	third	State;	second,	the	legal	entity	












b)	either	Claimant	does	not	 conduct	 substantial	business	activities	 in	 the	United	
States	 or	 Claimant	 is	 controlled	 by	 nationals	 of	 a	 third	 country	 with	 which	
Respondent	does	not	maintain	normal	economic	relations.		
The	Parties	agree	that	 these	are	the	relevant	conditions	under	Article	 I(2)	of	 the	
[US-Ecuador]	 BIT	 and	 that	 they	must	 be	met	 cumulatively	 (Ulysseas	 v.	 Ecuador,	
2010,	para	167).		
	
92 With	 respect	 to	 the	 substantive	 requirements	 for	 the	 application	 of	 the	 ‘denial	 of	
benefits’	clause,	arbitral	tribunals	have	signalled	the	scarce	guidance	when	it	comes	














(c)	 ability	 to	exercise	 substantial	 influence	over	 the	 selection	of	members	of	 the	
board	of	directors	or	any	other	managing	body.	
Where	there	is	doubt	as	to	whether	an	Investor	controls,	directly	or	indirectly,	an	

























Implementation	 Act	 Statement	 of	 Administrative	 Action	 of	 November	 1993,	
submitted	 to	 the	 US	 Congress	 and	 containing	 the	 actions	 proposed	 to	 implement	
NAFTA,	as	follows:	
	






95 With	 respect	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘control’,	 the	 tribunal	 in	 Ulysseas	 v.	 Ecuador	 first	
highlighted	that	while	‘[t]he	Parties	agree	also	that	the	term	“control”	means	the	“legal	
capacity	 to	 control”,	 they	 “disagree	 regarding	 whether	 control	 must	 be	 exercised	
“directly,”	 as	 argued	 by	 Claimant,	 or	may	 be	 exercised	 “indirectly,”	 as	 asserted	 by	








non-public	 shareholders’	 registers	 etc.	 are	 some	 of	 the	 difficulties	 created	 by	 the	
control-test	established	under	 the	 ‘denial	of	benefits’	 clause.	 It	has	been	suggested	
that	 ‘effective	 control	 as	 opposed	 to	 legal	 control	 is	 a	 more	 probing	 test	 for	 the	













has	 substantial	business	 activity	 in	Latvia,	 on	 the	basis	of	 its	 investment	 related	




on	 the	 issue	of	 ‘substantial	 business	 activity’.	 For	 example,	 in	Masdar	 v.	 Spain,	 the	
tribunal	concluded	the	following:	
	
There	 is	 no	 definition	 in	 the	 ECT	 itself	 of	 ‘substantial	 business	 activities.’	 The	
Tribunal	has	had	regard,	however,	to	the	decision	of	the	tribunal	in	AMTO	in	which	




the	 Respondent,	 but	 it	 concludes	 that	 the	 unchallenged	 evidence	 adduced	 by	
Claimant,	 notably	 as	 to	 its	 standing	 as	 a	 holding	 company	 with	 substantial	
international	assets	under	its	control	…	and	the	similarly	unchallenged	evidence	of	






98 In	 Pac	 Rim	 v.	 El	 Salvador,	 while	 the	 tribunal	 acknowledged	 that	 the	 group	 of	
companies	 of	which	 the	 putative	 investor	 formed	 a	 part	 had	 ‘substantial	 business	
activities’	 in	 the	 territory	 of	 the	 US,	 it	 held	 that	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 ‘denial	 of	
benefits’	 clause	 under	 CAFTA-DR,	 it	was	 the	 claimant’s	 individual	 activities	which	
would	qualify	the	substantial	business	in	the	territory	of	the	home	State:	
	
However, in the Tribunal’s view, this first condition under CAFTA Article 10.12.2 relates not 
to the collective activities of a group of companies, but to activities attributable to the 
‘enterprise’ itself, here the Claimant. If that enterprise’s own activities do not reach the level 
stipulated by CAFTA Article 10.12.2, it cannot aggregate to itself the separate activities of 
other natural or legal persons to increase the level of its own activities: those would not be 
the enterprise’s activities for the purpose of applying CAFTA Article 10.12.2 (Pac Rim v. El 









engaged in buying, selling, and contracting in that territory beyond the normal activities or 
functions required merely by the fact of its corporate existence (such as corporate registration 
and administration, including holding requisite board or shareholders’ meetings and the 
payment of associated taxes and corporate registration fees) (Jagusch and Sinclair, 2008, 20). 
 
100 ‘Substantial	business’	would	mean,	 as	 a	minimum,	 that	 the	 investor	 is	party	 to	
transactions	 in	 the	 home	 State,	 has	 employees	 involved	 in	 such	 transactions,	 has	
resident	 managers,	 etc.	 (Jagusch	 and	 Sinclair,	 2008,	 20).	 Usually,	 IIAs,	 and	 in	








(ii)	 the	 undertaking’s	 headquarters	 and/or	 management	 is	 established	 in	 that	
Contracting	Party;	
























(i)	 objectives/strategies/arrangements,	 the	 main	 purpose	 or	 one	 of	 the	 main	
purposes	of	which	is	to	avoid	tax	liabilities;		
(ii)	the	passive	holding	of	stock,	securities,	land,	or	other	property;	or		




by	 the	 alleged	 investor	 etc.	 are	 indicative	 elements	 in	 establishing	 a	 substantial	
business	activity.	As	such,	an	arbitral	tribunal,	based	on	the	evidence	presented	to	it,	




prerequisites	of	 the	clause,	 such	as	 the	 ‘control	or	ownership	by	 third	States’.	One	
could	 argue	 that	 the	 approach	 should	 be	 	 qualitative	 rather	 than	 quantitative	 	 as	
dictated	by	the	provisions	of	the	applicable	IIA.	In	this	sense,	the	object	of	assessment	
by	an	arbitral	 tribunal	 is	not	 the	magnitude	of	 the	business	on	 the	 territory	of	 the	
home	State	but	the	genuineness	of	the	business.	Consequently,	in	assessing	the	facts	



















Contracting	Party	 to	 the	ECT	(Libanaco	v.	Turkey,	2011,	paras	552-6).	As	such,	 the	















clause	 are	 both	 control	 from	 a	 third	 state	 party	 and	 lack	 of	 substantive	 business	
activity	in	the	state	of	alleged	nationality.	The	function	of	the	clauses	has	also	evolved	
from	an	attempt	to	merely	deny	tribunals	jurisdiction	to	hear	a	particular	matter	to	
more	 consistently	 denying	 prima	 facie	 investors	 benefits	 of	 IIA	 claims	 where	 the	





applied	 by	 tribunals	 with	 some	 matters	 being	 settled	 and	 uncontroversial	 (e.g.	
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